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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, understanding the determinants of civil conflict or civil war has become
a central concern for academics and policy makers alike (see, e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010,
for a recent overview).1 So far, however, less attention has been paid to the roots of less
intensive forms of conflicts such as mass demonstrations or violent riots. Yet, exploring the
causes of such “smaller events” is important for a variety of reasons. For one, demonstrations
and riots – even if they do not reach the intensity of civil conflicts or wars – disrupt economic
activity and hence are an obstacle to economic development, particularly in poor places.2 A
second reason is that, according to conventional wisdom, civil conflicts or civil wars rarely
start all of a sudden but are very often preceded by a chain of smaller events such as mass
demonstrations and riots (see, e.g., Labrousse, 1969, for a detailed account of how the “food
riots” of 1789, 1830 and 1848 in France turned into bigger conflicts). Thus, a better grasp of
the forces behind such low-intensity conflicts may help us to better understand the emergence
of truly disastrous events like full-blown civil wars.
In this paper, we make a first attempt at looking into the causes of mass demonstrations
and violent riots in autocratic states. The paper offers two main contributions. First, we
present a simple theoretical framework of social unrest (i.e., demonstrations or riots) from
which we derive a set of predictions. Second, we use a new database on low-intensity conflicts
in Sub-Saharan Africa to test these predictions, thereby carefully addressing causality issues.
Our theoretical framework belongs to the class of rational conflict models in which social unrest
may ensue between a constituted elite and the citizenry. We assume that the elite may try to
appropriate resources from the citizenry while the latter can resort to social unrest, albeit at
a cost, to oppose such a diversion. This setup gives rise to a simple Markovian equilibrium in
which we observe social unrest only if there is a negative economic shock. A positive economic
shocks, in contrast, has no impact whatsoever on the incidence of unrest. The intuition is that
the elite must set the level of diversion before the realization of the citizenry’s income. If the
elite expects the economy to remain in a “good” state, it opts for a high level since rioting
or demonstrating is expensive if incomes (and hence the opportunity cost) are high. Yet, if
incomes drop due to a “bad” economic shock, the cost of conflict goes down – and it becomes
suddenly worthwhile for the citizenry to fight resource diversion.
In order to assess these predictions empirically, we use a new source of data, the Social
1According to the usual definition, civil conflicts are internal conflicts that cause at least 25 battle death in
a single year while civil wars are bigger events that count more than 1000 battle death per year.
2For anecdotal evidence, see, e.g., an article in The Economist (“A cracked nation holds its breath”, January
17, 2008) which describes how the riots that erupted in Kenya in late 2007 imperiled the country’s economy.
2
Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD). SCAD provides data on various forms of social conflict,
among them demonstrations and riots, which usually cause only a “low” number of casualties
and hence are not covered in datasets on civil conflict or war.3 We further assemble data
on natural weather variation to address the endogeneity of economic variables to conflict.
According to Miguel et al. (2004), natural weather variation is likely to be an important source
of income volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa as many countries heavily depend on agricultural
production and only a tiny share of the cropland is irrigated. At the same time, weather
variations are truly exogenous to human behavior and should therefore be independent of social
conflicts. We thus introduce weather variations4 as external instruments for GDP per capita
(p.c.) in our estimation. However, we confirm previous results by Miguel and Satyanath (2011)
that show little influence of weather variation on GDP p.c., especially after 2000. We therefore
increase the relevance of our instruments by additionally including the (lagged) population
growth rate as well as the GDP p.c. growth rate of important trading partners. These variables
are usual candidates in the literature as instruments for the GDP p.c. (see, e.g., Baudry and
Collard, 2006) or for foreign aid (Ree and Nillesen, 2009).
The results for all specifications under consideration are robust and show the predicted
patterns. In particular, we find a statistically significant negative impact of GDP p.c. changes
on the contemporaneous incidence of demonstrations and riots. This holds for all specifications,
and the parameter estimates remain statistically significant after controlling for endogeneity.
We even see a tendency towards bigger effects when using instrumental variables (IV). In
particular, the IV estimates show that a contraction of the GDP p.c. of one standard deviation
(6.8%) leads to about 1.5 additional instances of social unrest in the average Sub-Saharan
country. Moreover, when controlling separately for negative and positive GDP p.c. shocks,
we find that the relationship between income changes and the incidence of conflict is entirely
driven by the negative shocks. Positive income shocks, as predicted by our simple theory, do
not appear to have any systematic effect on the frequency of demonstrations and riots.
By emphasizing that negative economic shocks may spark conflict, our theory is related to
models of civil war or political transitions. For instance, in the contest models proposed by
Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009, 2010) negative transitory shocks decrease the immediate
cost of fighting – but not the discounted present value of victory. The model thus predicts
that groups fight over power after a negative shock since they have less to lose than in periods
3In our country sample, the average number of casualties per incident varies across conflict categories and
ranges from 0.7 (organized demonstration) to 5.5 (spontaneous violent riot).
4Kudamatsu et al. (2011) point out that there may be a direct effect of specific weather conditions on social
unrest. We therefore control for potentially extreme weather events like heat waves, droughts, storms, and
floods to rule out direct effects.
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where generating output is more rewarding. Similarly, in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001)
theory of political change, negative economic shocks may induce democratization because – in
bad times – fighting the autocratic regime is relatively cheap. As result, such regimes might
be forced to make concessions when a negative shock hits.5
In other dimensions, however, there are stark differences. Our theory does not seek to
explain big events like civil wars or democratic transitions. We rather explore the occurrence
of smaller incidents like mass demonstrations or riots which may be sparked spontaneously by
bad economic shocks. Therefore, our model does not rely on competing groups of about the
same strength (as is usual in the literature) but rather assumes an asymmetric distribution of
power. In the present framework, the maximum that can be achieved by rioting is to obtain
immediate relief through a temporary reduction in resource diversion; a change in the balance
of power, on the other hand, is out of reach. As a result, the elite’s response to unrest is
not large-scale violence but rather taking measures to alleviate economic distress. This focus
on the immediate effects of economic shocks is also reflected in our empirical analysis which
looks at the contemporaneous association between changes in the GDP p.c. and the incidence
of social conflict. In contrast, the empirical work focusing on bigger events (e.g., Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2002; Miguel et al., 2004; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011) relates economic shocks to
subsequent outbreaks of civil war or political transitions.
Finally, note that our theory does not only well in terms of explaining the empirical evidence
on the incidence of social unrest. It is also consistent with how African governments responded
to a recent series of riots. As described by Berazneva and Lee (2011), 14 African countries
experienced severe rioting due to soaring food prices (and hence declining real incomes) in the
2007-2008 period. In most of these 14 countries, the government responded by taking measures
which dampened the fall in real incomes (e.g., by reducing duties on food imports). This is
exactly what the present theory would predict: In order to prevent the riots from going on
indefinitely, the elite does not primarily resort to violence but reduces the diversion of resources
and hence limits the fall in the citizenry’s real income.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The upcoming section lays out the simple theo-
retical model while Section 3 presents the econometric approach and the empirical results. In
Section 4, we discusses some policy implications and outline a future research agenda.
5In Besley and Persson (2008), positive economic shocks (in the form of higher resource rents that accrue
to the government) may lead to civil war because they increase the expected gains from fighting for power.
Similarly, in Oechslin (2010), it is an increase in government-controlled rents that may destabilize the incumbent
regime.
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2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
Agents and preferences. We focus on an infinite-horizon economy that consists of two
players, the elite (E) and the citizenry (N). The preferences of both players are given by
vi,t = Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βsiui(Ci,t+s)
}
, (1)
where ui denotes the concave and non-decreasing instantaneous utility function of player i ∈
{E,N}, Ci,t refers to consumption of the unique (non-storable) good in period t and 0 < βi < 1
is the discount factor.
Endowments. The consumption good is produced by the citizenry only. The output in any
given period t is either high (h) or low (l), Yt ∈ {Y l, Y h}, where Y h = λY l and λ ≥ 1. Changes
in output between two consecutive periods are exogenous. More specifically, we assume that
Yt = Yt−1 with probability q and Yt 6= Yt−1 with probability 1− q. Obviously, q is a measure
of the persistence in output, and we impose 1 ≥ q ≥ 1 − 1/λ. This assumption, consistent
with observations, rules out that dramatic shifts in output happen too frequently. Intuitively,
it requires an event that leads to a sharp reduction in output to be more persistent than an
event leading to just a mild drop.
The elite is endowed with the power to appropriate part of the output generated by the
citizenry. The magnitude of the desired resource appropriation is denoted by Tt. Whether or
not the elite is in fact able to enforce the desired appropriation level depends on whether the
citizenry will revolt, (Rt = 1), or not (Rt = 0). In the former case, the elite actually gets Tt,
whereas in the latter case it cannot appropriate anything. Thus, we have
CE,t = Tt(1−Rt). (2)
Note further that T must be determined one period in advance. This means that, for instance,
Tt has to be set in period t− 1. A complete timing of events is given below.
A natural way to look at the elite is to think that it is in control of the government and
hence can somehow extract resources from the private sector of the economy. Yet, changes in
the level of extraction cannot be implemented immediately but require some time (e.g., because
of necessary changes in extractive institutions).
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Social unrest. As mentioned above, the citizenry can avoid resource appropriation by stand-
ing up against the elite (e.g., by revolting). However, staging a revolt is associated with a cost
that is given by a fraction φ of the current output. Thus, the citizenry’s level of consumption
is given by
CN,t = (1−Rt)(Yt − Tt) +Rt(1− φ)Yt. (3)
Equilibrium concept and time line. The focus is on the (pure strategy) Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE), where strategies depend only on payoff-relevant states of the system.6
In the present setup, the state of the system is represented by the desired level of resource
extraction, Tt, and the output, Yt ∈ {Y l, Y h}.
The timing of events is as follows. First, all agents observe Tt and Yt. Second, the elite sets
the desired level of resource extraction, Tt+1, for the following period. Third, the citizenry de-
cides whether or not to revolt, Rt ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, all decisions are implemented, consumption
takes place, and the period ends.
2.2 Analysis
Decision on R. It is convenient to look first at the citizenry’s decision on whether or not to
revolt. Since the citizenry’s decision in a given period has neither implications for subsequent
decisions nor for the course of the state variables, the maximization of lifetime utility (1) is
achieved by maximizing current consumption (3) in every single period. In this regard, it is
straightforward to verify that Rt = 0 gives the highest level of consumption, and thus utility,
if and only if Tt ≤ φYt. As a result, the maximum level of resource extraction that just avoids
a revolt, T̂t, is given by
T̂t =
 T̂h = φY h : Yt = Y hT̂ l = φY l : Yt = Y l .
Put differently, the citizenry opts for Rt = 1 if and only if the desired level of resource extrac-
tion, Tt, happens to exceed the critical threshold T̂t:
Rt(Tt, Yt) =
 0 : Tt ≤ T̂t1 : Tt > T̂t . (4)
Note that T̂t is smaller when output is low. The reason is that the cost of revolting is
proportional to Yt and hence is smaller in times of low economic activity. Thus, in these times,
6Abstracting from potentially complicated punishment strategies allows us to focus on sharp predictions
easily transferable to an empirical setup. It is noteworthy, however, that simple punishment strategies such as
”Tit-for-Tat” or ”Trigger strategy” do not constitute proper Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of this game.
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the benefit of fighting the government exceed the cost of revolting at lower threshold.
Decision on T . We now move one step backwards and look at the elite’s decision on resource
extraction. Obviously, when deciding on Tt+1 (in period t), the elite takes the citizenry’s
response in the following period into account. Doing so implies that the elite will either opt for
T̂ l or T̂h: A level of Tt+1 below T̂
l cannot be optimal since it could be increased to T̂ l without
inducing the risk of a revolt; a level in between T̂ l and T̂h cannot be optimal either because
Tt+1 could be raised to T̂
h without increasing the probability of revolt; finally, a level above
T̂h can be ruled out because it would lead to a revolt with certainty.
As a result, when deciding on Tt+1 at the beginning of period t, the elite can concentrate
on the simple “binary” recursive problem
V E(Tt, Yt) = max
Tt+1∈{T̂ l,T̂h}
{
uE(CE,t) + βEEt
[
V E(Tt+1, Yt+1)
]}
, (5)
where V E refers to the corresponding value function.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the citizenry’s decision rule is given by (4). Then, if q ≥
uE(φY
l)/uE(φY
h),
Tt+1(Tt, Yt) =
 T̂h : Yt = Y hT̂ l : Yt = Y l (6)
is the solution to the recursive problem (5). Otherwise,
Tt+1(Tt, Yt) =
 T̂ l : Yt = Y hT̂ l : Yt = Y l (7)
solves (5).
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, to summarize, the MPE in this economy is represented by the policy functions (4)
and, depending on the persistence in output, (6) or (7).
2.3 Discussion
After having established the equilibrium, it remains to discuss the relationship between eco-
nomic activity and revolting. By looking at the definition of T̂t and policy function (4), it
becomes clear that – in any given period t – there will not be a revolt if Tt = T̂
l; moreover, the
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citizenry stays calm as well if Tt = T̂
h but Yt = Y
h. The only constellation that actually gives
rise to a revolt is (Tt, Yt) = (T̂
h, Y l). Yet, when does this constellation emerge? It is easy to
see that it requires q ≥ uE(φY l)/uE(φY h) and Yt−1 = Y h (so that Tt = T̂h according policy
function 6), but also Yt = Y
l. Put differently, the economy sees a revolt only if there is a fall
in output:
Rt = 1 =⇒ Yt − Yt−1 < 0.
On the other hand, if there is no change in output, or even a positive one, riots do not occur.
The explanation of why there may be revolts in equilibrium is that the elite is prepared to
take a “risk” if q is relatively high. In this case, claiming T̂h (and receiving this amount with
probability q) brings the elite a higher utility than getting T̂ l with certainty. As a result, the
economy sees a riot only in the event of an economic downturn.
3 Empirics
3.1 Data
The data we are using come from several sources. Information on social unrest in Africa
stems from a new dataset provided by the SCAD project.7 SCAD lists different types of
social unrest starting from 1990 for all African countries with a population size of more than
1 million. Among other things, the dataset contains detailed information on the number of
spontaneous and organized demonstrations and spontaneous and organized violent riots. We
aggregate these numbers to find the total number of demonstrations, riots, and instances of
social unrest in a given country and year. Real GDP p.c. and population data are taken from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of the GDP p.c. we included additional
variables that serve together with population growth as instruments in later regressions. The
climate variables for precipitation and temperature originate from the CRU 3.1 dataset pro-
vided by the climate research unit at the University of East Anglia. The CRU dataset is the
standard data used among climate scientists and the IPCC.8 The originally grid-based (0.5 to
0.5 degrees) and monthly data has been aggregated on country and year level in order to relate
climatic information to economic shocks. More precisely, for each country we accounted for
7Available at: www.scaddata.org. For further information see (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010)
8See http : //www.ipcc− data.org/obs/cruclimatologies.html. The advantage of CRU over similar weath-
erdata like GPCP (NASA) or ERA (ECMWF) is due to the fact that it contains both precipitation and
temperature data; has a relatively high resolution (0.5 to 0.5 degrees); goes back to the year 1901.
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the type of land use in order to capture the effect of weather conditions on economic activity.9
Data on natural disasters are taken from the EM-DAT database provided by the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Universite´ Catholique de Louvain.
By using this information, we are able to control for severe weather events that may have a
direct impact on social unrest and, if not taken into account, may cause problems when using
weather conditions as an IV for the GDP p.c. (Kudamatsu et al., 2010). We discuss this issue
in greater detail in the following section. Information for the most important trade partners
(Ree and Nillesen, 2009) is taken from the Bilateral Trade (v2.01) dataset of the correlates of
war project (COW) and the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Summary statistics for all variables can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
unrest 3.85 7.12 0 66 754
demo 2.28 3.86 0 34 754
riot 1.57 4 0 42 754
GDP (FD) 0.01 0.07 -0.69 0.64 753
pop 162.64 225.06 8.64 1513.19 754
prec 86.08 43.41 14.38 230.54 754
temp 24.61 3.5 11.56 30.14 754
flood 0.58 0.94 0 7 754
drought 0.14 0.35 0 2 754
storm 0.13 0.47 0 4 754
exttemp 0.01 0.08 0 1 754
top5 3.36 2.54 -15.79 15.31 752
Note: unrest stands for the sum of all demonstrations (demo) and riots in a given country and year. GDP (FD) stands
for the first difference of real per capita GDP in logs as defined in the following section. trade5 stands for the average
GDP per capita growth of the 5 most important trade partners. pop is population in 100,000. temp and prec are
average yearly temperature and precipitation for a country controlling for irrelevant regions (see web-appendix). In
addition, we use information on extreme weather events like the number of floods, storms, droughts, and heat waves
(exttemp) in later regressions.
3.2 Econometric Approach
Specifications. In order to test our theoretical predictions, we use the change in the GDP
p.c. from year t−1 to t to model economic shocks.10 Following the previous empirical literature
on the topic, we do not include the level of the GDP p.c. as an explanatory variable as it is
9For more information on the data and the aggregation process see the web appendix available at:
http : //staff.vwi.unibe.ch/almer/download/suapp.pdf
10In particular, we are using the first difference of the GDP p.c. in logs – which, in turn, is the log approxi-
mation of the growth rate.
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highly persistent and its use may cause problems due to non-stationarity (see, e.g., Bru¨ckner,
2011). The basic version of the model to be estimated is therefore the following:
Sit = α+ βYit + µi + γt + ²it, (8)
where S stands for the level of social unrest (number of events in a given country i and year t),11
Y for the change in log real GDP p.c. (Yit = logGDPit − logGDPit−1), and µ, γ, and ² stand
for country-specific effects, year-specific effects and the error term, respectively. Moreover, in
order to check for robustness, we also estimated several alternative specifications that can be
found in Section 3.3 and in the appendix. These include using random trends/country-specific
time trends (
∑
i trendt ∗ µi) instead of year dummies γt (as in Miguel et al., 2004) and a
dynamic specification (Ciccone, 2011) of the form Sit = α+ βsSit−1 + βyYit + µi + γt + ²i,t.
In order to check for potential mean reversion (see, e.g., Ciccone, 2011), we also use the
percentage deviation to the moving average of the last 3 years of GDP p.c. as this smoothes the
series.12 Results can be found in Panel A of Table 5 in the appendix. Additionally, we estimate
a conditional fixed effects poisson and negative binomial13 model to account for the count data
structure of the dependent variable, and present the results in Section 3.3. However, given the
data structure of our panel (N = 41, T = 20) and the resulting incidental parameters problem
for large T (see, e.g., Fernandez-Val and Vella, 2011), we focus on linear specifications when
accounting for potential endogeneity as it has been done in the existing literature (see, e.g.,
Miguel et al., 2004; Burke and Leigh, 2010; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011; or Bru¨ckner, 2011).
Addressing endogeneity. The main challenge when analyzing the causal effect of income
shocks on the level of social unrest is to account for endogeneity of almost any kind. It may
not only be that current and past incidences of social unrest affect income (reverse causation)
but also that third factors influence both income and social unrest at the same time (omitted
variable bias). The resulting biases would be incorporated in the parameter estimate for β and
therefore interfere with the true effect income shocks have on social unrest. In order to correct
for potential endogeneity of income shocks in equation (8), we therefore apply IV and GMM
estimation using different external and internal instruments.
11As a sensitivity check we estimated an alternative specification using the growth of social unrest relative to
the country mean as the dependent variable. The reason is that countries may respond differently in terms of
magnitude to a given income shock depending on their average level of social unrest or the size of the country.
The reader can find the results in Panel B of Table 6 in the appendix. Results are globally robust to this
alternative specification with slightly higher standard errors.
12The exact formula is [Yit − (1/3) ∗ [Yit−3 + Yit−2 + Yit−1]] / [(1/3) ∗ [Yit−3 + Yit−2 + Yit−1]].
13There is evidence for overdispersion in our data, see Table 1.
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The internal instruments are based on the work by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arrellano
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), and the corresponding results can be found in Table
7 (columns 1-3) in the appendix. Moreover, we use several external instruments in order to
maximize their relevance for the GDP p.c. and to be able to test the resulting overidentifying
restrictions. Those instruments include precipitation, lagged population growth, and the GDP
growth of the individual most important trade partners of country i at year t.
According to Miguel et al. (2004), Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2011), and Burke and Leigh
(2009), variation in weather conditions is a very important determinant of income volatility in
Sub-Saharan Africa as many countries heavily depend on agricultural production. Moreover,
such variations are truly exogenous to human behavior and should therefore be independent of
social conflicts. As a result, weather conditions are popular candidate instruments for GDP in
many circumstances. However, Kudamatsu et al. (2010) argue that weather conditions may
influence conflict not only through income but also through health conditions. In this case,
weather related information might not be an adequate instrument for GDP p.c. To account
for this potential problem, we include several indicators for extreme weather events like the
number of extreme temperatures, droughts, storms, and floods in our equation of interest when
using IVs. The idea is to avoid that our weather variables, e.g., through extreme events in the
first stage regression, influence conflict in other ways than through GDP p.c. We therefore want
to ensure that our instrumental variables reproduce “usual” variations of weather conditions.
However, we confirm previous results by Miguel and Satyanath (2011) in finding that weather
seems to be a rather poor instrument in terms of relevance.
In order to increase the relevance of our instruments, we additionally include lagged popu-
lation growth and GDP p.c. growth of important trade partners. Population growth is known
to be an important determinant of GDP growth (for recent examples, see, e.g., Galor and Weil,
2000; Baudry and Collard, 2006) and one of the rare components of any kind of country-level
growth regression (Durlauf et al., 2005) that we expect to be independent of social unrest (es-
pecially for lagged population growth). We validate this assumption in Section 3.3 by means of
a difference-in-Hansen test. The last candidate instruments originate from a literature on the
effects of foreign aid on civil war where GDP p.c. growth of important trade partners is used
as instrument for aid (Ree and Nillesen, 2009). We build on this literature and use GDP p.c.
growth of important trade partners as instrument for changes in domestic GDP p.c. Again,
we assume that trade partner j’s GDP growth rate is independent of social unrest in country
i but influences changes in the GDP p.c. in country i.
The first observation is that weather conditions constitute rather weak instruments for
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GDP p.c changes (see also Miguel and Satyanath, 2011). In fact, precipitation turns out to
be of relevance for GDP only after expanding the functional form, controlling for the type of
land use, and accounting for lagged effects as done in column 4.14 Moreover, we only find very
little evidence for temperature to influence GDP in our dataset. In contrast, there is little
doubt that the first lag of population growth15 is important, especially in terms of relevance
when explaining variations in GDP p.c., as can be seen by both the highly economically and
statistically significant estimate (columns 5 and 7 of Table 2).16 The average GDP p.c. growth
of the 5 most important trade partners proofs to be a valid instrument (columns 6 and 7) but
also has a rather small effect on the domestic GDP p.c.
3.3 Results
Baseline estimation results. The results for all specifications under consideration are ro-
bust and show the expected patterns. We find a negative and statistically significant impact
of the first difference of real GDP p.c. (GDP (FD)) on the level of social unrest. This holds
for all specifications including the basic linear (Panel A of Table 3), count data (Panel B), and
dynamic models (columns 1-3 of Panel C) and all kinds of alternative specifications for GDP
(in Table 5 in the appendix). Moreover, effects are robust for demonstrations (demo), riots
(riot), and the sum of the two (unrest). The estimates range from -2 to -6. Similar results
show up when using country-specific time trends instead of year dummies as done in columns
4-6 (Panel A of Table 3). In Panel B, the reader finds results for conditional fixed-effects (FE)
poisson (columns 1-3) and negative binomial (4-6) models which account for the count data
structure of the dependent variable. Although parameter estimates are smaller (especially for
total unrest), they still show estimates of around -2 and are highly statistically significant. Fi-
nally, in columns 1-3 of Panel C, results for the linear dynamic panel estimates (bias-correction
as proposed by, e.g., Kiviet, 1995 and Bruno, 2005 using system GMM in a first step) are
shown. Again, although social unrest seems to be persistent, results remain robust and show
the expected negative effect of GDP p.c.
In order to study the way how income shocks affect social unrest in greater detail, we need
to discriminate between the different types of income shocks. In particular, it might be the
case that a positive income shock (Yit > 0) reduces social unrest or that a negative shock
14We tested numerous different specifications for the weather variables (and the remaining candidate instru-
ments) including changes in climatic conditions (first-differences, growth, deviations from moving averages), lag
structures, and nonlinearities.
15Results are almost identical when using contemporaneous population growth. However, in order preclude
any correlation with the level of social unrest we prefer using the first lag.
16There is no evidence for lagged or nonlinear effects in case of population growth or GDP growth of trade
partners.
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Table 2: First-Stage Estimates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
drought -0.0101 -0.0109 -0.00868 -0.00929 -0.00920 -0.0125 -0.0133
(0.064) (0.049) (0.100) (0.090) (0.112) (0.013) (0.013)
storm -0.00329 -0.00336 -0.00267 -0.00271 -0.00152 -0.00485 -0.00368
(0.475) (0.469) (0.576) (0.559) (0.736) (0.251) (0.361)
flood 0.00599 0.00573 0.00532 0.00547 0.00497 0.00551 0.00509
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.011) (0.024)
exttemp -0.138 -0.135 -0.139 -0.132 -0.122 -0.138 -0.120
(0.240) (0.254) (0.238) (0.272) (0.247) (0.234) (0.259)
prec -0.0261 0.0188
(0.164) (0.899)
temp -0.294 1.027
(0.134) (0.502)
L.prec -0.269 2.328 1.955
(0.076) (0.082) (0.127)
prec2 -0.00429
(0.826)
L.prec2 0.0345 -0.638 -0.538
(0.081) (0.076) (0.116)
L.temp 0.445
(0.736)
temp2 -0.215
(0.405)
L.temp2 -0.0512
(0.829)
L.prec3 0.0566 0.0479
(0.073) (0.109)
L.pop 1.500 1.476
(0.009) (0.007)
trade5 -0.00373 -0.00316
(0.003) (0.008)
N 753 753 753 753 753 752 752
R2 0.131 0.135 0.130 0.147 0.194 0.143 0.225
R2 adj. 0.0499 0.0518 0.0462 0.0666 0.120 0.0643 0.149
Note: p-values in parentheses. All estimates are first stage estimates (GDP p.c. change as the dependent variable)
of linear fixed-effects IV estimation using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors and
small sample adjustments.
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(Yit < 0) boosts unrest, or both. According to the prediction of our theoretical framework,
we expect negative income shock to be the one that lead to a clear-cut positive effect on
social unrest, whereas positive shocks are predicted to have no influence. In order to reveal
potential heterogeneous effects, we estimated the basic model by including specific dummies
derived from GDP p.c. (see columns 4-6 of Panel C of Table 3). In particular, we included
three dummies for GDP p.c. shocks, where GDP25 reflects severe negative shocks (in terms
of distribution in the data), GDP50 stands for moderate negative shocks, and GDP75 stands
for exceptional positive shocks.17 The resulting pattern is unambiguous. It turns out that
especially severe negative income shocks increase the prevalence of social unrest, especially for
riots with estimates ranging from 0.6 to 1.3.
IV estimation results. It has already been extensively discussed that the GDP p.c. may
suffer from different types of endogeneity in the present setting. Therefore, we use several
external instruments including precipitation, population growth, and economic conditions of
important trade partners (estimates for internal instruments can be found in Table 7 in the
appendix). Results can be found in Table 4. In line with what one would expect, standard errors
increase compared to the benchmark results but the parameter estimates remain statistically
significant, at least when we increase the relevance of our set of instruments. Moreover, we
even find a tendency towards even more economically significant effects of GDP p.c. changes.
In Table 4, we further report several test statistics that are of importance when evaluating
our IV estimates. First, we report the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test of under-identification.
There is evidence for the instruments to be of relevance if we can reject the Null of under-
identification. Moreover, we report the Hansen (1982) test of over-identifying restrictions,
where the Null of orthogonality of the joint instruments is of interest. Finally, we display the
difference-in-Hansen test, or C-statistic, that allows us to check for the orthogonality of single
components of the set of excluded instruments. What we can observe is additional evidence
for the weakness of weather in our IV estimation. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test of
under-identification does not reject the Null of under-identification when using only weather
instruments (see column 1-3 of Panel A in Table 4). However, when using lagged population
growth, GDP growth of important trade partners, or all instruments together, we are able
to reject the Null. For the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions, we never find
evidence against the Null of the validity of the instruments for any specification. As one might
suspect that lagged population growth is not fully exogenous in our setup, we additionally
17A detailed description of the formulas can be found in the notes of Table 3.
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Table 3: Baseline Estimates
Panel A
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -6.044 -3.657 -2.387 -5.955 -3.412 -2.543
(0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001)
N 753 753 753 753 753 753
Time Effects TD TD TD RT RT RT
Panel B
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -2.256 -2.071 -2.594 -1.963 -2.111 -2.038
(0.002) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.026)
N 753 753 753 753 753 753
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Panel C
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -4.955 -3.420 -2.013
(0.008) (0.006) (0.075)
L.unrest 0.643
(0.000)
L.demo 0.363
(0.000)
L.riot 0.650
(0.000)
GDP25 1.322 0.738 0.584
(0.062) (0.119) (0.033)
GDP50 -0.0979 -0.0694 -0.0285
(0.891) (0.855) (0.950)
GDP75 -0.220 -0.287 0.0664
(0.643) (0.413) (0.793)
N 714 714 714 753 753 753
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Note: p-values in parentheses. Panel A: GDP (FD): First-Difference of real log GDP per capita. Estimates show
linear fixed-effects (within) estimation using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Discroll and Kray, 1998). Discroll and
Kraay propose standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence.
TD stand for year dummies and RT for random trends as used in Miguel et al. (2004). Panel B: Conditional Fixed-
effects poisson (column 1-3) and negative binomial (column 4-6) estimation using bootstrapped (on clusters) standard
errors with 100 repetitions. TD stand for year dummies. Panel C: For the dynamic specification (columns 1-3)
a bias-correction procedure has been implemented with bootstrapped standard errors (50 repetitions) using system
GMM as a first stage estimate (see Kviet, 1995, Bun et al. 2003 and Bruno, 2005). Columns 4-6 present linear fixed-
effects estimates using dummies for specific intervals of GDP per capita change and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
In particular: GDP25 = 1[Yit < percentile(25)], GDP50 = 1[0 > Yit > percentile(25)], and GDP75 = 1[Yit >
percentile(75)]. Hence, moderate positive changes in GDP per capita serve as benchmark.
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report a difference-in-Hansen statistic to test for its orthogonality. By looking at the p-values
displayed in columns 4-6 of Panel B in Table 4, we do not find any evidence against the validity
of the instrument.
On a side note, we also find the suspected direct effects of extreme weather conditions on
conflict (Kudamatsu et al., 2010). Especially floods, and to a lesser extend droughts, seem to
influence both the GDP p.c. and social unrest (see Table 4).18
The parameter estimates for the difference in log GDP p.c. (GDP (FD)) in our IV estima-
tions show a consistent general pattern. We do find consistently larger negative estimates19
ranging between -5.7 (riots, significant at the 20% level), -14 (demonstrations, significant at
the 10% level), and -21 (sum of both, significant at the 10% level). Note that the estimates
we obtain when using weather conditions as instruments are close to the ones suspected to be
endogenous. However, when we add lagged population growth and GDP p.c. growth of trade
partners, the IV estimates become bigger. Recalling that in our setup weather conditions is not
a strong instrument, a candidate explanation is that the IV estimates are biased toward the
OLS estimates if the instrument is weak (see , e.g., Han and Hausmann, 2003). Alternatively,
Maccini and Yang (2009) explain similar low coefficient estimates through the measurement er-
ror in rainfall: Classical measurement error in the instrument will lead to attenuated coefficient
estimates.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Mass demonstrations and violent riots are widespread forms of social unrest in developing
countries. There is no doubt that such incidents disrupt commerce and – if recurring frequently
– may even impede long-run economic growth. Guided by a simple theoretical framework, this
paper explores the roots of social unrest in Africa. Exploiting a new dataset, our empirical
analysis suggests that negative income shocks are an important driving force of demonstrations
and riots. In particular, our instrumental variables estimates identify a negative relationship
between the change in the GDP p.c. (from t − 1 to t) and the contemporaneous incidence
of social unrest. Interestingly, we further find that this negative relationship is mainly driven
by economic downturns: While strong negative shocks increases the incidence of social unrest,
positive changes in income do little to promote stability.
The apparent asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative shocks is a reason for
18The IV estimates are not driven by the inclusion of extreme weather events. The results are robust when
these variables are excluded (see Table 6 in the appendix).
19Except for the cases where we use the internal instruments (Table 7) or the weather variables only. In these
two cases, the estimates are in a similar range as the benchmark results in Table 3.
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Table 4: IV Estimates
Panel A
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -4.613 -3.253 -1.359 -21.06 -13.92 -7.140
(0.701) (0.702) (0.804) (0.084) (0.060) (0.174)
drought -0.511 -0.149 -0.362 -0.659 -0.245 -0.414
(0.213) (0.555) (0.116) (0.112) (0.344) (0.070)
storm 0.299 0.0161 0.283 0.251 -0.0148 0.266
(0.499) (0.957) (0.210) (0.565) (0.959) (0.235)
flood 1.322 0.506 0.815 1.410 0.564 0.846
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008)
exttemp 2.174 -1.118 3.291 -0.0697 -2.573 2.503
(0.742) (0.689) (0.428) (0.992) (0.376) (0.551)
N 753 753 753 753 753 753
F 1.583 1.864 1.178 1.686 2.086 1.152
R2 0.133 0.105 0.116 0.0922 0.0472 0.104
Klei 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.0380 0.0380 0.0380
Hans 0.221 0.629 0.146
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Instruments Clim Clim Clim POP POP POP
Panel B
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -20.89 -15.63 -5.257 -17.48 -11.72 -5.761
(0.415) (0.270) (0.719) (0.076) (0.053) (0.176)
drought -0.726 -0.312 -0.414 -0.688 -0.268 -0.420
(0.096) (0.222) (0.114) (0.093) (0.288) (0.067)
storm 0.196 -0.0615 0.258 0.212 -0.0430 0.255
(0.660) (0.835) (0.266) (0.627) (0.883) (0.258)
flood 1.408 0.572 0.836 1.390 0.551 0.839
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008)
exttemp -0.0813 -2.832 2.751 0.387 -2.295 2.682
(0.992) (0.443) (0.579) (0.954) (0.416) (0.524)
N 752 752 752 752 752 752
F 1.740 2.072 1.227 1.782 2.108 1.240
R2 0.0951 0.0279 0.112 0.112 0.0731 0.111
Klei 0.00304 0.00304 0.00304 0.0391 0.0391 0.0391
Hans 0.456 0.774 0.365
CStat 0.634 0.610 0.760
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Instruments Trade Trade Trade All All All
Note: p-values in parentheses. Estimates for linear fixed-effects IV estimation using HAC robust standard errors.
Klei reports p-values for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification test, Hans for the Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions, and CStat for the C-statistic or Difference-in-Hansen test of orthogonality of lagged
population growth (Baum et al., 2011). Panel A: Using only precipitation (Clim) as instrument (columns 1 - 3, see
column 4 of Table 2). Using lagged population growth as instrument (columns 4 - 6). Panel B: Using GDP p.c.
growth of important trade partners as instrument (columns 1 - 3). Using all instruments (columns 4 - 6, see column
7 in Table 2).
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concern. It implies that a higher volatility in GDP p.c. growth (e.g., due to more volatile
weather conditions or a higher incidence of income shocks affecting important trade partners)
leads to more demonstrations and riots. So our empirical findings suggest that climate change,
by promoting greater variability in weather conditions, is likely to increase the level of social
unrest in Africa. As a result, at least via the social-unrest channel, climate change should
be expected to reduce the region’s growth prospects. This prediction, in turn, has a number
of clear policy implications. First, it implies that governments should reinforce measures to
alleviate the impact of exogenous shocks on domestic incomes. For instance, better irrigation
of arable land would mitigate the negative impact of extreme weather events (like droughts)
on agricultural production and hence incomes. Second, governments should do more to reduce
the level of resource diversion in good times. If that were achieved, the probability that an
economic downturn sparks social unrest would be lower.
By offering new theoretical insights and empirical results, the present paper gives also rise
to a number of new questions that would be interesting to address. For instance, anecdotal
evidence suggests that “bigger events” like civil conflict or regime change are often preceded
by periods of social unrest (while, of course, not all periods of social unrest lead to civil conflict
and regime change). So an obvious question would be whether we find such correlations in
cross-country data. Similarly, it would be of obvious importance to have a model that would
allow us to explore the circumstances under which social unrest is more or less likely to escalate
into such bigger events. Addressing these questions would help to fill the void between research
on social unrest and the literature on civil conflict or regime change. At the moment, we leave
these questions to future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. In a first step, note that the elite’s decision on Tt+1 has no impact
on CE,t. The elite’s current level of consumption (2) is determined by the two state variables,
Tt and Yt, and the current decision by the citizenry, Rt (which, in turn, is independent of
Tt+1). Thus, the recursive problem (5) can be rewritten as
V E(Tt, Yt) = uE(CE,t) + βE max
Tt+1∈{T̂ l,T̂h}
{
Et
[
V E(Tt+1, Yt+1)
]}
. (5’)
The next step is now to substitute for V E(Tt+1, Yt+1) in problem (5’) using this recursive
definition of V E for period t+ 1. This eventually gives us
V E(Tt, Yt) = uE(CE,t) + βE max
Tt+1∈{T̂ l,T̂h}
{Et [uE(CE,t+1]) + βEEt [Zt+1]} , (5”)
where
Zt+1 ≡ max
Tt+2∈{T̂ l,T̂h}
{
Et+1
[
V E(Tt+2, Yt+2)
]}
.
We now establish that, depending on the persistence in output, either (6) or (7) constitutes
the solution to the recursive problem (5”). Given that one of these policy functions is applied
in all future periods, Zt+1 is unaffected by the decision on Tt+1 and hence Et [Zt+1] is viewed as
a constant by the elite. So the elite simply chooses Tt+1 to maximize Et [uE(CE,t+1)] . Suppose
first that Yt = Y
h. Then, due to the law of motion of Y and the citizenry’s decision rule (4), the
elite will choose T̂h only if quE(φYh) ≥ uE(φYl), i.e., only if q ≥ uE(φYl)/uE(φYh). Otherwise,
if q < uE(φYl)/uE(φYh), the elite will opt for the low level of diversion, T̂
l.
Suppose now that Yt = Y
l. Then, the elite will choose T̂ l only if uE(φYl) ≥ (1−q)uE(φYh),
i.e., only if q ≥ 1 − uE(φYl)/uE(φYh). It happens that this inequality always holds: By
concavity of uE(·), we have λuE(φYl) ≥ uE(λφYl) and hence uE(φYl)/uE(φYh) ≥ 1/λ (recall
that Yh = λYl by notation). But this entails 1− uE(φYl)/uE(φYh) ≤ 1− 1/λ ≤ q so that the
elite always chooses T̂ l when Yt = Y
l. Thus, depending on whether q is greater than or less
than uE(φYl)/uE(φYh), the elite’s policy function is given by either (6) or (7).
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A.1 Tables
Table 5: Additional Estimates I
Panel A: Percentage Change to 3 Years Moving Average
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
MA GDP -4.406 -2.683 -1.723 -4.808 -2.636 -2.172
(0.008) (0.016) (0.027) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006)
N 753 753 753 753 753 753
Time Effects TD TD TD RT RT RT
Panel B: Including Lags
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -5.949 -3.644 -2.305 -5.685 -3.252 -2.433
(0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.017) (0.007)
GDP (FD), lag 1 -3.061 -2.027 -1.033 -3.700 -2.167 -1.533
(0.003) (0.015) (0.081) (0.000) (0.003) (0.011)
GDP (FD), lag 2 0.853 1.084 -0.231 0.267 1.014 -0.747
(0.372) (0.126) (0.578) (0.786) (0.100) (0.241)
N 750 750 750 750 750 750
Time Effects TD TD TD RT RT RT
Panel C: Nonlinearities
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -5.284 -3.283 -2.001 -5.372 -3.063 -2.308
(0.010) (0.026) (0.021) (0.005) (0.023) (0.002)
GDP (FD), squared 5.786 2.844 2.942 5.468 3.270 2.199
(0.197) (0.327) (0.153) (0.015) (0.128) (0.023)
N 753 753 753 753 753 753
Time Effects TD TD TD RT RT RT
Note: p-values in parentheses. Linear fixed-effects estimation using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Discroll and Kraay,
1998). Panel A:MA GDP stands for the percentage deviation of the change of GDP p.c. (GDP (FD)) from its moving
average of the preceding three years. Panel B: Including lags 1 and 2 of GDP (FD). Panel C: Including GDP (FD)
squared.
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Table 6: Additional Estimates II
Panel A: IV estimates using alternative sets of instruments
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -19.90 -12.81 -7.089 -17.06 -10.80 -6.267
(0.058) (0.045) (0.119) (0.080) (0.074) (0.126)
N 752 752 752 753 753 753
F 1.895 2.281 1.274 1.797 2.147 1.248
R2 0.0461 0.0307 0.0391 0.0590 0.0496 0.0428
Klei 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 0.142 0.142 0.142
Hans 0.840 0.737 0.978 0.251 0.596 0.181
Cstat 0.840 0.737 0.978 0.534 0.434 0.736
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Instruments All All All All NoClim NoClim
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -17.13 -10.97 -6.157 -10.62 -7.058 -3.567
(0.065) (0.056) (0.118) (0.399) (0.394) (0.554)
N 752 752 752 752 752 752
F 1.895 2.232 1.305 1.891 2.115 1.394
R2 0.0602 0.0499 0.0439 0.0809 0.0764 0.0517
Klei 0.0384 0.0384 0.0384 0.0199 0.0199 0.0199
Hans 0.337 0.681 0.266 0.203 0.535 0.154
Cstat 0.555 0.528 0.577 0.483 0.397 0.537
Time Effects TD TD TD TD TD TD
Instruments NoTrade NoTrade NoTrade NoPop NoPop NoPop
Panel B: Growth rates
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
GDP (FD) -1.985 -1.791 -2.636 -4.796 -5.323 -2.784
(0.000) (0.005) (0.015) (0.140) (0.087) (0.503)
N 753 753 753 752 752 752
F 10213.0 9893.7 402.3 4.361 3.914 2.417
R2 0.0594 0.0389 0.0374
Klei 0.0384 0.0384 0.0384
Hans 0.814 0.939 0.432
Cstat 0.412 0.380 0.793
Note: p-values in parentheses. Panel A: Estimates for linear fixed-effects IV estimation using HAC robust standard
errors. Klei reports p-values for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification test, Hans for the Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions, and CStat for the C-statistic or Difference-in-Hansen test of orthogonality of lagged
population growth (Baum et al., 2007). Concerning the set of instruments: All represents all available instruments
including precipitation, lagged population growth and per capita GDP growth of trade partners. Accordingly, NoClim
means that precipitation has been excluded, etc.. Panel B: The dependent variable here is the growth rate of
social unrest relative to the country mean. In particular, (Sit − Si)/Si). Results show linear FE estimates using
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (columns 1-3) and IV estimates using HAC robust standard errors (columns 4-6). All
estimates include year dummies. IV estimates use all available instruments (precipitation, growth of trade partners,
and population growth).
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Table 7: Additional Estimates III
GMM estimation
unrest demo riot unrest demo riot
drought -0.282 0.363 -0.645 -0.608 -0.265 -0.391
(0.751) (0.513) (0.194) (0.124) (0.271) (0.085)
storm 0.00337 -0.224 0.227 0.203 -0.0423 0.240
(0.999) (0.806) (0.844) (0.641) (0.885) (0.283)
flood 0.960 0.428 0.532 1.316 0.556 0.732
(0.113) (0.234) (0.108) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015)
exttemp 0.386 -0.377 0.763 -1.499 -2.464 1.125
(0.855) (0.754) (0.564) (0.812) (0.367) (0.774)
GDP (FD) -3.903 -2.496 -1.407 -16.97 -12.22 -5.429
(0.052) (0.061) (0.278) (0.073) (0.037) (0.178)
N 753 753 753 752 752 752
F 1.963 2.349 1.199
R2 0.112 0.0683 0.107
Klei 0.0391 0.0391 0.0391
Hans 0.456 0.774 0.365
Cstat 0.634 0.610 0.760
Sargan 0.8083 0.9590 0.5323
arm1 0.0000 0.0041 0.0032
arm2 0.3874 0.4059 0.9587
Note: p-values in parentheses. Columns 1 -3 report system GMM estimates using robust standard errors and lags 1
and 2 as instruments for GDP in the difference equation (see Blundell, 1998). Sargan, and arm stand for p-values of
the Sargan statistic and autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2. Columns 4-6 report results for GMM estimation of the
linear fixed effects model presented in table 4 using all external instruments. Time dummies (and a constant) have
been included but omitted here.
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